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III.

I.

ARGUMENT

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING PORTIONS OF MR.
CATHEY'S DEPOSITION TESTIMONY THAT PROVIDED EXPERT
OPINIONS CONCERNING CAUSATION.
The district court's ruling to exclude portions of Mr. Cathey's deposition opinions

as to the effect of the wick drain installation on the pipeline was in error and exceeded the
limits of reasonability. Contrary to Appellees' contentions, Mr. Cathey's experience
qualified him as an expert under U.R.E. 702 and the Shepherd decision, and the error was
not hannless to Appellants.

A. Mr. Cathey's Experience with Damage from Third-Party Sources, and His
Observation of the Wick Drain Installers, Qualified Him as an Expert to
Opine as to the Effect of the Wick Drain Installers on the Pipeline.
Appellees' brief recognizes that it is a low "threshold showing" standard for
admissibility of an expert's opinion under U .R.E. 702(b ). In addition, Appellees also
recognize this Court's interpretation of Rule 702, that to make a threshold showing under
Rule 702(b) based upon experiential opinions the expert "did not need to identify a
particular methodology." State v. Shepherd, 2015 UT App 208, ,I 34, 357 P .3d 598, 609.
Moreover, Appellees also recognize the Utah Supreme Court's ruling that
"[i]dentification of a methodology is not necessary where exposure to a nearly identical
situation forms the basis of the expert's opinions." Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson v. Davis

Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 2010 UT 59, ,I 15, 242 P.3d 762. Mr. Cathey's experience, at
minimum, meets this threshold standard under U.R.E. 702(b).
Notably, Appellees' citation to the United States v. Bynum decision, (Brief of
Appellees, p. 20), is misleading. Appellees' citation to Bynum indicates that a particular
Page 5 of23
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methodology is necessary for experiential opinions under Rule 702(b). However, this is
contrary to this Court's statement in Shepherd that a particular methodology is not
needed. In addition, the language that Appellees cite to from Bynum was cited by this
Court in Shepherd when stating that an expert "did not need to identify a particular
methodology." Shepherd, 2015 UT App 208, ,r 34.
Moreover, in Eskelson, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the district court's
determination that an expert needed to identify a specific methodology in order to
provide an expert opinion as to causation. There, the plaintiff had proffered the expert
opinion of a physician as to the cause of the plaintiff's ear injuries during the removal of
an object from the ear. The Court stated that the physician's "testimony regarding his
experience as a physician, in dealing with similar situations as [the plaintiffs], constitutes
a threshold showing of reliability." Eskelson, 2010 UT 59, ,r 15. The fact that the
physician had similar experience with removal of foreign objects from ears satisfied the
threshold showing under Rule 702(b), and identification of a methodology was therefore
not necessary. Id.
Thus, both Shepherd and Eskelson ruled that expert experiential opinions need not
identify a particular methodology when the expert has experience with a similar
condition. Despite this, Appellees argue that Mr. Cathey's opinions as to the effect of the
wick drain installation hitting the pipeline are inadmissible because Mr. Cathey's
opinions do not identify a specific methodology of "how he reached his excluded
opinions ...." (Brief of Appellees, p. 24). This argument by Appellees would require
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identification of a methodology which is not required for Mr. Cathey's experiential
expert opinion.
Nevertheless, it is readily apparent from Mr. Cathey's deposition transcript what
the application of the facts are that form the basis for his excluded opinions. His
excluded opinions were: a wick drain installer would have damaged a pipeline and "got
broke into it;" that the wick drain installer had not struck the pipeline; and that "no
coating will stand a wick drain hitting it." (Dep. Cathey, Cover page, R. p. 718, Dep. pp.
33:23 - 34:2; 36:8- 37:4; 38:13-18). He was specifically asked: "What is the basis for
that belief' that the wick drain installers had not struck the pipeline at the time he
inspected it. (Dep. Cathey, Cover page, R. p. 718, Dep. p. 36:17). Mr. Cathey responded
by pointing to his report and that he "[d]id not find anything that would indicate a coating
holiday." (Dep. Cathey, Cover page, R. p. 718, Dep. p. 36:18-20). He then explained at
length his observations of where the wick drains were located during his testing. (Dep.
Cathey, Cover page, R. p. 718, Dep. pp. 36:20 - 37:23).
In addition, Mr. Cathey later described his vast experience with "many cases
where a pipeline was struck by a third party and the coating was damaged ...." He
described that he has found "probably over 100,000 coating holidays," including from
third-party sources. (Dep. Cathey, Cover page, R. p. 718, Dep. p. 40:14-25). When Mr.
Cathey explained that "third-party damage is very apparent" compared to damage from
installation issues, he was then specifically asked: ''How is that? Is there some sort of a
typical scenario?" Mr. Cathey then explained: "Third party damage is some kind of
mechanical machine it's normally going to damage the pipe as well as the coating.
Page 7 of23
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You're going to have a gouge of so~e magnitude in the pipe as well." (Dep. Cathey,
Cover page, R. p. 718, Dep. p. 41:9-17). As recognized by Appellees, Cathey's DCVG
test did not find any issues with the pipeline's coating in the area where the wick drains
~

were installed. (Brief of Appellees, p. 34). Thus, although identification of his
methodology is unneeded for experiential expert opinions under the Shepherd and

Eskelson decisions, Mr. Cathey's deposition testimony nevertheless identifies the
application of his experience with pipeline damage to third-party sources to the pipeline.
In addition, Appellees are incorrect that Mr. Cathey "does not have sufficient
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge to offer reliable opinions regarding
the potential effects of a wick drain hitting a pipeline." (Brief of Appellees, p. 22).
Appellees' argument would require an expert to have experience with an identical

~

situation, rather than a similar one. This is contrary to the rulings of Shepherd and

Eskelson. As discussed in Appellants' original brief, the expert in Shepherd was
determined to have sufficient experience to opine as to a boat hitting a human, based
upon that expert's experience with a boat hitting a seal. (Original Brief of Appellants, pp.
18-24). In Eskelson, the physician was determined to have sufficient experience to meet
the threshold showing of Rule 702(b) by dealing with "similar situations" because the
physician had experience with "removal of foreign objects from the ears of children."
~

Eskelson, 2010 UT 59, ,i 15.
As discussed in Appellants' original brief, Mr. Cathey has sufficient experience to
opine as to the effects of a wick drain installer impacting a pipeline due to: being
employed in the pipeline testing industry for 31 years, including testing for pipeline
Page 8 of23
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holidays; being extremely knowledgeable about pipeline coatings and corrosion;
observing five to seven large installation machines during the wick drain installation
process while on scene for his DCVG test; and being able to describe the wick drain
installation process. Importantly, his qualifying experience with similar conditions also
include his vast prior experience in testing for and finding over 100,000 coating holidays,
including those caused by being struck from a third party source. (Brief of Appellants,

pp. 22-25). Mr. Cathey is thus qualified to opine as to the effect of damage that could
happen by impact from the wick drain installer. Indeed, he is more experienced than the
expert in Shepherd because he actually had experience in observing the wick drain
installation process, and could explain it. (Dep. Cathey, Cover page, R. p. 718, Dep. pp.
25: 17-22; 33: 14 - 34:2; 36:8 - 37:4).
Regarding Appellees' argument that foundation was not laid as to the effect of a
wick drain hitting a pipeline, this argument relies solely upon Appellees having objected
to foundation at the time of the deposition. However,just because an attorney objected to
a question does not mean that the objection is valid and that the question must be
rephrased. U.R.C.P. 30(c) ("All objections shall be recorded, but the questioning shall
proceed, and the testimony taken subject to the objections."). Rather, as identified from
the above discussion of Mr. Cathey's experience and qualifications, there was sufficient
foundation for Mr. Cathey to opine as to the effects of a third party source (the wick drain
installer) impacting the pipeline.
Moreover, Appellees' argument under Ross v. Epic Engineering, PC does not
apply to the issue on this appeal. The issue in Ross was whether an expert geotechnical
Page 9 of23
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engineer could opine as to the standard of care for a structural engineer. This Court ruled
that the expert was not qualified to opine as to the standard of care for a wholly different
profession due to that expert not being a structural engineer, not having experience with
designing buildings, and stating that he did not have an opinion as to another profession's
applicable standard of care. Ross v. Epic Engineering, PC, 2013 UT App 136, ifif6-18,
307 P.3d 576, 578-582. The issue in this case is not whether Mr. Cathey can opine as to
the standard of care for a different profession. Indeed, the Ross decision does not discuss
or interpret "experiential foundation" under U.R.E. 702(b), which is the issue before this
Court on appeal. As such, Ross does not apply to the present case.

B. This Court's Opinion in State v. Shepherd Supports Appellants' Position.
Though Appellees argue. that the Shepherd decision does not support Appellants'
position, this argument re-addresses the issues stated above. Thus, as discussed above
and in Appellants' original brief, Shepherd is directly applicable and renders Mr.
Cathey' s excluded opinions as admissible.
Moreover, Appellees' discussion of Shepherd not being applicable focuses on how
the expert in Shepherd provided an analogy to the facts of that case. Appellees then state
that "Mr. Cathey was not asked to render, and never suggested that he had rendered, an
opinion based upon a situation factually analogous to a wick drain hitting a pipeline."
(Brief of Appellees', p. 30). This is incorrect. Notably, Appellees' brief does not even
address Mr. Cathey's 31 years of experience with testing pipelines for damage from third
party sources. Mr. Cathey's vast experience with testing for damage from third party
sources is factually analogous to this case, where Appellees are asserting pipeline damage
Page 10 of23
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from a third party source (wick drain installers). Appellees' brief does not even discuss
this third party testing experience.
Notwithstanding, Mr. Cathey was asked at his deposition to explain how third
party damage is ''very apparent" compared to installation issues. He was asked: "How is
that? Is there some sort of a typical scenario?" Mr. Cathey provided the following
response:
"Third party damage is some kind of mechanical machine, it's
normally going to damage the pipe as well as the coating. You 're
going to have a gouge of some magnitude in the pipe as well."
(Dep. Cathey, Cover page, R. p. 718, Dep. pp. 41 :9-17). Again, Appellees do not dispute
that Mr. Cathey's DCVG test did not find any issues with the pipeline's coating in the
area where the wick drains were installed. (Brief of Appellees, p. 34).
Thus, not only was Mr. Cathey asked for an analogy, but Mr. Cathey actually
explained how it is that third party damage is apparent, specifically that a mechanical
machine would damage the pipeline and cause a gouge. Appellees' statement that Mr.
Cathey did not reference "any experiences that were even remotely similar to the
situation at issue in this case" is false. He did, and he has extensive experience of
detecting over 100,000 coating holidays, including caused by third party sources. Thus,
the Shepherd decision supports Appellants' position, as Mr. Cathey is even more
experienced than the expert in Shepherd whose opinions were ruled admissible.
C. The District Court's Error Was Not Harmless to Appellants

The district court's error in excluding key testimony from Mr. Cathey, who was
retained by Appellees to investigate any damage to the pipeline, harmed Appellants in
Page 11 of23
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being able to present their theory of the case. Thus, there is a reasonable likelihood that a

C½v

different verdict would have been rendered. In addition, Mr. Cathey's excluded opinions
were not cumulative of other evidence.
1. There Is A Reasonable Likelihood of a Different Verdict.

Appellees' argument logically does not make sense. Appellees argue that a
different jury verdict would not have been rendered if Mr. Cathey's opinions were
admitted. In support of this, Appellees discuss a "plethora of evidence demonstrating
that UDOT damages the pipeline while installing wick drains." (Brief of Appellees, p.
33). Appellees then cite to the testimony of their own employee (Mr. Baxter) and their
own retained expert (Mr. Gilson). However, this is exactly why there is a likelihood of a
different verdict: Appellees have not have pointed to any other opinions that were

~

presented to the jury that supported Appellants' defense that the wick drain installation
did not damage the pipeline. Appellees were entitled to present their theory of the case,
~

especially as to allegations of causation for the pipeline damage. With the exclusion of

Mr. Cathey's expert opinions that the pipeline was not injured from the wick drain
installation, Appellants were not able to present any opinions to defend Appellees' claim
of causation. Mr. Cathey's opinions are the only ones to support Appellants' defense as
to causation, and they were excluded. With the presentation of his opinions, there is at
least a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have rendered a different verdict.
Moreover, Appellees point to the jury deliberating for "only 45 minutes" before
reaching a unanimous verdict. Again, this was likely because Appellants were precluded
from presenting their case due to the exclusion of Mr. Cathey's opinions.
Page 12 of23
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~

In addition, Mr. Cathey was retained by Appellees, not Appellants. Thus, with the
presentation of Appellees' own retained expert opining that the pipeline was not damaged
from the wick drain installation, there is at least a reasonable likelihood that the jury
would have rendered a different verdict based upon the gravity of such opinion in light of
the source of it.
Appellees also discuss that Appellants were permitted to introduce Mr. Cathey's
testimony of the DCVG test not finding any coating holidays where the wick drains were
installed. Appellees thus argue that there is no prejudice to Appellants because the jury
already heard Mr. Cathey's opinions as to there not being any coating holidays from his
DCVG test. Essentially, Appellees argue that there was no need for the jury to hear Mr.
Cathey's actual opinions of the effect of the wick drain installer had it impacted the
pipeline. This argument begs the question of why Appellees would still have opposed
(and do now still oppose) admission of Mr. Cathey's opinions. Of course admission of
Mr. Cathey's opinions was important for the jury to hear. His opinions would explain the
significance of the DCVG test results, and that they support Appellants not being the
cause of the pipeline damage. This would be based upon opinions from Appellants' own
retained expert.

Appellees seek to exclude the sole defense trial testimony on the primary issue of
causation, yet they assert that excluding that expert opinion would not have resulted in a
different outcome. That argument does not make sense.
2. The District Court's Error Was Harmful Because Mr. Cathey's
Excluded Opinions Were Not Cumulative of Other Evidence.
Page 13 of23
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Appellees' argument that there was no harm in excluding Mr. Cathey's opinions
because they were cumulative of other evidence also does not make any sense, and is
incorrect. As with the above argument as to the likelihood of a different verdict,
Appellees only cite to opinions and evidence from their own employee and retained
expert. So, this again begs the question of why Appellees opposed (and why do they still
oppose) admission of Mr. Cathey's expert opinions if they are not harmful and are
duplicative of prior evidence.
Moreover, Mr. Cathey's opinions are not cumulative of other evidence. The
evidence cited by Appellees from Mr. Gilson was that the pipeline was struck, resulting
in dents to the pipeline. However, Appellants' position was that if the pipeline was
struck by a wick drain installer, then there would have been more damage thanjust dents;
' thus, the wick drain installation did not impact the pipeline. This position was supported
by Mr. Cathey's opinion that the wick drain installation needle would have "broke into
it," that "no [pipeline] coating will stand a wick drain hitting it," and accordingly that the
wick drain installers did not strike the pipeline. (Dep. Cathey, Cover page, R. p. 718,
Dep. pp. 33:23 -34:2; 36:8 -37:4; 38:13-18). There was no other testimony at trial

~

opining as to the extent of the damage being beyond the coating, and certainly no other
opinion that the wick drain installers did not strike the pipeline. Appellees have not
~

pointed to any such testimony. Thus, the excluded testimony is not cumulative of other
evidence.
Exclusion of Mr. Cathey's expert opinions as to the effects of wick drain installers
hitting the pipeline was therefore in error, resulting in harm to Appellants. Reversal and
Page 14 of23
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remand is thus appropriate for this reason alone.

II..

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY NOT STRIKING
AND NOT ISSUING A CURATIVE INSTRUCTION AS TO MR.
MILLER'S UNSOLICITED AND INADMISSIBLE EXPERT OPINION.
Appellees do not dispute that Mr. Miller provided an unsolicited expert opinion.

Appellees also do not dispute, or even address, that Mr. Miller's unsolicited expert
opinion is inadmissible under U .R.C.P. 26 because Mr. Miller was not identified as an
expert. Moreover, Appellees do not dispute that this error was harmful to Appellants.
Indeed, Appellees recognize that the district court stated that Mr. Miller could not have
provided such expert opinion. (Brief of Appellees, p. 41).
Rather, Appellees focus on whether Appellants can appeal the issue. As discussed
herein, the invited error doctrine does not apply, the objection was not waived, and the
district court's ruling did not grant Appellants' requested relief. Moreover, the issue was
properly preserved for review.

A. The Invited Error Doctrine Does Not Preclude Appellate Review as to Mr.
Miller's Unsolicited Expert Opinion In This Case.
The invited error doctrine does not preclude appellate review of the district court's
ruling because the doctrine does not apply in this case.
Appellees argue that the issue as to Mr. Miller's inadmissible expert opinion was
not preserved on appeal. It was. Appellants' counsel objected to Mr. Miller's nonresponsive opinion and "move[d] to strike the opinion of this witness about the ...
effectiveness of the DCVO test.. .. I'd ask that the testimony be stricken .... " (Record,
pp. 1644:21 - 1645:16). Appellants' counsel correctly preserved the claim of error by

0v
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objecting and moving to strike the unsolicited testimony once it was given. U.R.E.
103(a) (stating that an error is preserved if a party objects to the admission of evidence or
moves to strike it).

1

~

As recognized by Appellees, the purpose of the invited error doctrine is so "that a
party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial
court into committing the error." State v. McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, ,r 24,302 P.3d 844.
However, in this case, Appellants did not lead the district court into the error; rather, the
district court instead sought to preclude the jury from receiving a curative instruction.
Application ofU.R.E. 103(b) establishes that the invited error doctrine does not
apply in this case:

"Not Needing to Renew an Objection or Offer of Proof. Once the
court rules definitively on the record - either before or at trial - a
party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a
claim of error for appeal."
U .R.E. 103(b) (emphasis in original). As such, Appellants were not required to continue
to object to the district court's ruling so as to ensure that error was preserved, or to
express opposition to the court's ruling.
In this case, Appellants objected and moved to strike the testimony. (R., pp.

Though Appellants assert that the error was properly preserved, to the extent that it
may not be considered properly preserved, this Court can still take notice of the error,
including but not limited to in consideration of the cumulative error doctrine discussed in
Section III below. U.R.E. 103(e)("A court may take notice of a plain error affecting a
substantial right, even if the claim of error was not properly preserved.") In this case,
allowing a non-disclosed expert (Mr. Miller) to provide an impeaching expert opinion of
a witness (Mr. Cathey) who was not available for trail, and whose expert opinions on
causation were ruled inadmissible, affects the substantial right of Appellants in their
opportunity to present their theory of the case.
Page 16 of23
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1644:21- 1645:16). The district court judge then agreed that Mr. Miller could not have
provided such expert opinion. (R., p. 1649:8-11 ). The Court then stated its reluctency to
instruct the jury to disregard the testimony because doing so would emphasize the
testimony with the jury. (R., pp. 1650:24- 1651:3; 1652:10-12). Then, after a lengthy
discussion between the district court and counsel for both parties, the district court did
not instruct the jury to disregard the testimony, and nor did it grant Appellants' motion to
<iJ

strike Mr. Miller's testimony. This was after the court recognized that "he [Mr. Miller]
shouldn't be able to say that DCVG things stink and that they're not useful." (R., p.
1649:9-11 ). Rather, the Court's ruling ended up being that: "I'm going to say what he's
testified he's testified and that's where I'm going to leave it." (R., p. 1656:6-7). Thus,
the district court did not sustain Appellants' objection and did not grant the motion to
strike, despite the court's recognition that Mr. Miller should not have been able to
provide that expert opinion.
The district court's resolution to Appellants' motion to strike was therefore not
invited because Appellants' counsel continued to assert opposition to Mr. Miller's
testimony and the scope of what testimony he could further proffer. Just because
Appellees' counsel agreed to change direction of his questioning of Mr. Miller away from
the DCVG test does not mean that the court's ruling granted Appellants' motion to strike.
(R., p. 1656:10-11).
Rather, the district court's ruling does not comply with U.R.E. 103:
"Preventing the Jury from Hearing Inadmissible Evidence. To
the extent practicable, the court must conduct a jury trial so that
inadmissible evidence is not suggested to the jury by any means."
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U.R.E. 103(d); see also State of Utah, in the interest ofN.A.D., 2014 UT App 249, ,rs,
338 P.3d 226, 228 (stating that, in a jury trial, the district court is "required" to conduct
the trial so that the jury does not hear inadmissible evidence."). Notably, U.R.E. 103(d)
does not provide any exception for whether an attorney agrees or disagrees with the court
action to prevent the jury from hearing inadmissible evidence. Rather, Rule 103(d)
~

provides a procedural imperative that once a court detennines evidence to be
inadmissible, then "by any means" it must conduct the trial so that the inadmissible
testimony is not suggested to or heard by the jury. As curative instruction would have
done so with the jury. Indeed, curative instructions have been identified by the Utah
Supreme Court as "a settled and necessary feature of our judicial process and one of the
most important tools by which a court may remedy errors at trial .... " State v. Harmon,
340 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 956 P.2d 262, 272 (Utah 1998).
Yet despite recognizing that Mr. Miller should not have been permitted to provide
the unsolicited expert opinion, the district court did not do anything to prevent the jury
from hearing this inadmissible evidence. Instead, it twice told Appellants' counsel the
futility of doing so, and ended up doing nothing to remedy the error. This is in contrast to
the Utah Supreme Court's statement that "our judicial system greatly relies upon the
jury's integrity to uphold the jury oath, including its promise to follow all of the judge's
instructions." Id (emphasis in original). Once the Court determined that Mr. Miller's
opinion was inadmissible, it should have complied with U.R.E. 103(d) by striking the
opinion and issuing a curative instruction, irrespective of any input from counsel.
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So, rather than Appellants' counsel leading the court to the error, the district court
instead made statements showing its reluctency to issue a curative instruction to the jury.
This is contrary to the procedural imperative of U .R.E. 103(d) and merits reversal.
B. Appellants' Objection Was Not Waived.

Appellees' assertion of waiver is based upon their incorrect premise that
Appellants' appeal is predicated only upon the district court's failure to give a curative
instruction. Rather, the Court never actually ruled that Mr. Miller's opinion was struck,
· never granted Appellants' motion to strike, and never sustained Appellants' objection.
Instead, the court ruled: "I'm going to say what he's testified he's testified and that's
where I'm going to leave it." (R., pp. 1655:1 - 1656:7). This was despite the Court
recognizing that Mr. Miller should not have been able to provide that expert opinion. (R.,
p. 1649:9-11). Indeed, Appellees do not even argue that Mr. Miller's unsolicited expert
opinion was admissible. This is because it is not. Thus, once the district court identified
~

the opinion as inadmissible, then (as discussed above) it should have used "any means"
for the jury not to hear it under U .R.E. 103(d).
Moreover, Appellants did not waive their objection to the permitted scope of Mr.
Miller's testimony with regard to the sufficiency of the DCVG test. Appellants' counsel
continued to object to the scope of testimony by Mr. Miller on the subject until the
district court stated: "I'm going to say what he's testified he's testified and that's where
I'm going to leave it." (R., pp. 1655:1 - 1656:7). As such, Appellants did not waive their
objection or motion to strike.
C. The Court Did_ Not Grant Appellants' Requested Relief.
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~

As discussed above, Appellants' requested relief was not granted. As with the
above issues, Appellees' position is incorrectly premised solely on a curative instruction.
Appellants objected to the unsolicited expert testimony of Mr. Miller, and moved to
strike it. Appellants persisted with its objection to the scope of Mr. Miller's testimony up
until the district court stated: "I'm going to say what he's testified he's testified and that's
where I'm going to leave it." (R., p. 1656:6-8). As such, the motion to strike was not
granted. Therefore, Appellants' requested relief was not granted.

III.

UNDER THE CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE, APPELLANTS WERE
NOT AFFORDED A FAIR TRIAL; THUS, REVSERSAL AND REMAND IS
APPROPRIATE.
Notably, Appellees do not even address Appellants' assertion of the cumulative

effect of these multiple errors. (Brief of Appellants, p. 32, discussing Whitehead v.
American Motor Sales Corp., 801 P.2d at 928 (Utah 1990)). Though Appellees focus on
waiver and the invited error doctrine in regards to Mr. Miller's inadmissible expert
opinion, it is also the cumulative effect of this error with the exclusion of Mr. Cathey's
expert opinions that further merits reversal and remand. Again, Appellants do not contest
that Mr. Miller's unsolicited expert opinion was inadmissible pursuant to Rule 26.
Under the cumulative error doctrine, "we will reverse if the cumulative effect of
the several errors undermines our confidence that a fair trial was had." State v. Dunn,
850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) (internal citation omitted).
In Whitehead, the Utah Supreme Court invoked the cumulative error doctrine and
stated:
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"While no one error by itself perhaps mandates reversal, the
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our confidence
that defendants were able to present to the jury their theory of the
case and that a fair trial was had."
Whitehead, 801 P .2d 920, 928 (Utah 1990).

The Court in Whitehead invoked the cumulative error doctrine because the trial
court had erroneously excluded evidence by defendants that ''was necessary to rebut the
assertions that Plaintiffs made to establish liability." Id. Specifically, the trial court had
excluded rebuttal evidence concerning tests done on exemplar vehicles, and it limited the
scope of the defendants' cross-examination of an expert. Id.
GD

"In assessing a claim of cumulative error, we consider all the identified errors, as
well as any errors we assume may have occurred." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1229. In
this case, Appellees have identified the aforementioned two errors with regard to Mr.
Cathey and Mr. Miller's opinions.
In regards to Mr. Cathey's opinions, the district court excluded evidence that was
necessary for Appellants to rebut Appellees' claims that Appellants caused the pipeline
dents. Yet, with regard to Mr. Miller's opinions, the jury was permitted to hear and
consider impeaching, inadmissible expert opinion as to the effectiveness of Mr. Cathey's
DCVG test. Unlike in Whitehead, where the Court noted that no one error by itself
perhaps mandated reversal, in this case, the errors each alone merit reversal. However, in
addition, the cumulative effect of the errors was that Appellants could not present the key
opinions of Mr. Cathey as to causation, yet Appellees were permitted to have the jury
hear the inadmissible expert opinion of Mr. Miller regarding Mr. Cathey's testing. Mr.
Page 21 of23
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~

Cathey was not present to address Mr. Miller's impeaching opinion. In effect, Appellants
were not permitted their expert's opinion as to causation, but Appellees got an additional
expert opinion. Thus, based upon the cumulative effect of these errors, the substantial
iJ

rights of Appellants were affected as Appellants were not able to "present to the jury their
theory of the case." Whitehead, 801 P.2d at 928; see also Utah R. Evid. 103(a) ("A party
may claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only if the error affects a

~

substantial right of the party ....").
As such, just as in Whitehead, the cumulative effect of the district court's errors
merits reversal and remand of the district court's ruling and judgment.
Lastly, the last line of Appellees' brief requests an award of attorney fees and
costs incurred relative to the appeal "after an appropriate motion is filed." Appellees'
request should be denied on both procedural and substantive grounds. Substantively,
Appellants' appeal should be granted for the bases set forth above, and at the least, the
appeal has merit. Procedurally, Appellees are not permitted to bring a separate motion
for fees, as they indicate in their brief. Rather, Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure provides that a request to recovery attorney fees incurred on appeal
"shall" be provided for in the argument section of an appellate brief:
"A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall
state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an
award."
Utah R. Appellate P. 24(a)(9) (emphasis added).
As such, no separate motion by Appellees is permitted. Though Appellees set
forth the request in its brief, they fail to set forth the required legal authority or basis for
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(i:)

the request. Thus, the request must be denied, in the event that Appellants' appeal is not
@

granted.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing bases, Defendants respectfully request that the district court's
rulings be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial, with Brent Cathey' s opinions
being admissible, and Mr. Miller not being permitted to provide expert opinion, as set
GI

forth above.
Respectfully Submitted this 14th day of September, 2016.
DEWHIRST & DOLVEN, LL
By Isl K le L. Shoo
Rick N. Haderlie, Esq.
Kyle L. Shoop, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants, .
Utah Department of Transportation and
Ames Construction, Inc.
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